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Recent theoretical debates in human geography have been characterised by a 
preference for ontological styles of argument. The ontologisation of theory is 
associated with distinctive claims about rethinking ‘the political’. This paper draws 
on an avowedly ‘non-representationalist’ philosophical perspective to develop an 
interpretation of ontology-talk as a genre that provides reasons for certain 
commitments. This argument is developed with reference to recent accounts of the 
spatial politics of affect in cultural geography and urban studies, and of the 
neuropolitics of media affects in political theory. The commitments that the ontology 
of affect provides reasons for are shown to revolve around understandings of the 
value of democracy. Assertions of the political relevance of ontologies of affect 
rhetorically appeal to norms that are not explicitly avowed from these theoretical 
perspectives. The ontologisation of affect depends on a particular settlement of the 
priority-claims of different families of concepts. The combination of an ontological 
style of theoretical analysis and an imperative to claim relevance for affective aspects 
of life in terms of rethinking ‘the political’ leads to a presentation of affect as an 
effective modality of manipulation mediated by infrastructures of public space. 
The ontological presentation of affect therefore forecloses on a series of normative 
questions provoked by the acknowledgement of the affective aspects of life. While 
the value of democracy is thrown into new relief by affect onto-stories, the full 
implications of any likely reconfiguration of our understandings of democracy remain 
to be elaborated in this line of thought, not least because it avoids any engagement 
with the principle of participation by all affected interests.
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Introduction
 
Human geography has recently seen a flourishing
of research on ‘affect’. This is part of a broader
movement of developing ‘non-representational’
ontologies. Advocates of ‘non-representational’
approaches have offered assertive statements of
the relevance of this style of analysis for under-
standing what counts as ‘the political’ (e.g. Amin
and Thrift 2002 2005). This in turn has generated
a highly charged debate over whether these
approaches measure up to preferred criteria of
political seriousness (e.g. Smith 2005; Amin and
Thrift 2007).
This paper does not ask whether ‘non-representa-
tional’ approaches in general are political enough,
or whether they are political in the right way. It
focuses instead on ontologies of affect, and identifies
a specific normative blind-spot that emerges when
adherents of these ontologies surrender to the urgent
demand to come clean about the ‘political’ salience
of this perspective.
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The argument proceeds in three stages.
First, the next section elaborates an avowedly
‘non-representationalist’ interpretation of ontological
vocabularies that informs the critical argument
developed in the rest of the paper. There are different
possible interpretations of the widespread acknow-
ledgement of the dependence of propositional
intentionality on a background of practical attune-
ments to situated environments (see Haugeland
1998). It is argued that the ontologisation of affect
reduces embodied knowing to the dimension of
mute attunement and coping with environments.
This elides the aspect of embodied knowing that
involves the capacity to take part in ‘games of giving
and asking for reasons’.
Second, the tendency for ontologies of affect to
answer the demand for politics through recourse to
the trope of manipulation is explored, with reference
to two key theorists of this approach: the work of
Nigel Thrift on the spatial politics of affect and William
Connolly’s theorisation of the cultural politics of
neurologically transmitted media affects. Thrift’s
work has explicitly set out to invent a field of ‘non-
representational theory’ in which affect is ascribed
considerable significance as both an object of
analysis and as a theoretical orientation. Connolly’s
work has provided resources for articulating an
ontology of affect with a programme of political
analysis that directly addresses issues in normative
democratic theory. The third and fourth sections of
the paper focus on these two related fields of social
science, in which ontologies of affect have been
presented as carrying political weight by virtue of
the light they throw on the ways in which power
circulates in public space. Thrift’s spatial politics of
affect and Connolly’s neuropolitics of affect converge
around a particular construal of affect as a means
of manipulating political subjects without them
knowing it. The trope of manipulation occurs in the
 
critical account of the politics of affect
 
 that one finds in
these ontologies. Understanding affect is a pressing
political task, it is argued, because ‘the systematic
manipulation of “motivational propensities” has
become a key political technology’ (Thrift 2007, 26).
The same trope of manipulation troubles the efforts
of Thrift and Connolly to outline an 
 
affirmative
account of the politics of affect
 
, in which progressive
politics is presented as various tactical experiments
on the dispositions of dispersed publics.
Third, the combination of a rhetoric of manipulation
with a strong ontological claim about the conceptual
priority of affective registers over deliberative ones
is seen to generate a normative blind spot in these
political ontologies of affect. This is discussed in
the fifth section. In trying to square an affirmative
account of the politics of affect with a critical
account of the politics of affect, political ontologies
of affect implicitly avow normative values that
the theoretical resources they mobilise appear to
undermine. This is most evident in the oblique ref-
erence to the value of democracy in these accounts.
By identifying how the ontology of affect is translated
into a genre of democratic ethos which is presented
as preferable to alternative theories of democratic
pluralism, the enactment of this ontology is thrown
into new perspective as being offered as a 
 
reason
 
for certain 
 
commitments
 
. And in so far as it stands
as the reason for such commitments, adherents to
this ontology are exposed to being called on to give
further reasons to justify these commitments.
The conclusion spells out two sets of questions
around which turn judgements of claims about
‘the politics of affect’.
 
Arguing with theory
 
The ascendancy of an ontological register of theoretical
argument in contemporary human geography is
indicated by the abstract delimitation of the ‘the
cultural’ from ‘the economic’, the ‘discursive’ from
the ‘material’, ‘being’ from ‘becoming’, ‘the human’
from ‘the non-human’, the ‘representational’ from
the ‘non-representational’, the ‘rational’ from the
‘more-than-rational’. Getting your ontology right,
which usually means avowing that one holds to a
‘relational ontology’, has become the benchmark of
theoretical probity. The ascendancy of this sort of
ontological register reflects a move to 
 
philosophise
 
social science (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006). It is
supposed that inquiry can and must be preceded
by clearly delimiting the general metaphysical
properties possessed by objects of analysis.
The ontologisation of theory in human geography
marks a distinctive inflection of a broad array of
post-foundationalist philosophies. Post-foundational
philosophies hold that the world of human affairs
is not only held together by relationships of know-
ledge, and where it is, knowledge is not a matter
of certainty (e.g. Cavell 1979; Taylor 1995). They
promise to deflate approaches that prioritise the
epistemological aspects of action, and which assume
that non-cognitive grounds of action and belief are
suspect. The resurgent theme of affect in the social
sciences and the humanities is illustrative of this
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post-foundational deflation of overly cognitivist
models of action.
The ontologisation of theory has been associated
with a strong preference for models of ethical and
political agency that focus attention upon embodied,
affective dispositions of subjects. This reflects the
influence of various theoretical and philosophical
traditions that share a deep suspicion of ‘cognitivist’,
‘intellectualist’ or ‘mentalist’ construals of human
action. This follows from a widely shared intuition
that propositional ‘knowing-that’ is a function of
embodied ‘knowing-how’. Once it is acknowledged
that ‘knowing-how’ involves all sorts of learned,
embodied dispositions that are inscribed in various
types of ‘unconscious’ disposition of anticipation
and response, then theoretical traditions that are
too partial to a picture of a social world governed
by rules, principles and practices of reason seem
constricted or even wrong-headed.
Consistent with the ontological drift of certain
strands of cultural theory and ‘Continental philosophy’
(Hemmings 2005; White 2000), in human geography
affect has become the sort of thing one can have ‘a
theory of’, where this amounts to the correct delimita-
tion of the ontological status of affective forces (e.g.
Anderson B 2006; Anderson and Harrison 2006;
McCormack 2007). Thrift (2004a, 464; 2007, 223–35)
identifies a family of research fields concerned with
affect: cultural-theoretic work on performance;
Sylvan Tomkins’ seminal work on affect; Deleuze’s
reading of Spinoza; and Darwinian accounts.
Psychoanalysis is also acknowledged as a source,
somewhat reluctantly. So-called ‘non-representational
theory’ (Thrift 2007) derives a highly abstract definition
of affect from this range of work. Affect is presented
as an ontological layer of embodied existence,
delimited by reference to the purely formal relation-
ship of the capacity 
 
to be affected
 
 and 
 
to affect
 
. In this
presentation, affect is doubly located: in the relational
in-between of fields of interaction; and layered
below the level of minded, intentional consciousness.
This vocabulary of the ‘layering’ of thinking, feeling
and judgement is fundamental to the political reson-
ances claimed on behalf of ontologies of affect.
In principle, post-foundational philosophies which
acknowledge that practical reasoning goes on
against a background of affective dispositions and
desires could be expected to reconfigure what,
following Ryle (1949, 10), we might call ‘the logical
geography’ of action. However, when the post-
foundationalist avowal of the importance of embodied
‘knowing-how’ is interpreted in terms of ‘layer-cake’
ontologies of practice, there is a tendency to simply
assert the conceptual priority of previously denigrated
terms – affect over reason, practice over representa-
tion. Disputes over the significance for social science
of post-foundationalist philosophy turn on the
types of priority-claim that are assumed to follow
from ontological assertions that ready-at-handedness,
background or affective attunement stand as the
background to embodied action.
The ontologisation of affect in recent cultural
theory is associated with the explicit adoption of a
layer-cake interpretation of the relationship between
practice and expression. Layer-cake interpretations
present propositional intentionality as resting
upon a more basic level of pre-conceptual, practical
intentionality in such a way as to present propositional
intentionality as derivative of this layer of practical
attunement (Brandom 2002, 328). On this view, the
practical presupposition of the available, ready-
at-hand qualities of environments in embodied actions
that treat these environments as merely occurrent,
or present-at-hand, is interpreted as implying an
order of 
 
conceptual priority
 
 of the practical (Brandom
2002, 332). This model of conceptual priority puts
in place a view of practical attunement as a stratum
that is autonomous of propositional intentionality.
It is treated as a layer that ‘could be in place before,
or otherwise in the absence of the particular linguistic
practices that permit anything to show up or be
represented as merely 
 
there
 
’ (Brandom 2002, 80).
This view of practice as an autonomous layer
therefore reproduces a representationalist view of
representational practices in order to assert the
superiority of an avowedly ‘non-representational’
stance.
In contrast to this view, we might instead suppose
that the priority of practice only holds in 
 
the order of
explanation 
 
(Brandom 2002, 332). This implies that
we cannot understand propositional intentionality
without first understanding its dependence on
practice, without supposing that this requires an
understanding of practice as an intentional layer
that kicks-in before others. It means presuming
that the capacity to represent things as being a
certain way is
 
the result of applying an assertional-inferential filter to
things available to us in the first instance as exhibiting
various sorts of practical significance. (Brandom 2002, 80)
 
This alternative interpretation does not assert the
priority of one ‘layer’ over another. Rather, it
reconfigures our understanding of what we are
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doing
 
 when representational discourse breaks out,
when we say ‘that things are thus-and-so’ (Brandom
2002, 80). Rejecting the layer-cake interpretation of
the type of priority that practice is said to have over
propositional intentionality leads to a reconfiguration
of the pragmatics of expressive rationality. Rather
than supposing that acts of expression are ways
of transforming an inner content into an outer
expression, in a representational way, we instead
think in terms of acts of making explicit what is
implicit, in an 
 
inferential
 
 way (Brandom 2001, 8).
An interpretation in terms of the explanatory
priority of practice therefore allows us to understand
in inferential terms the embodied capacity for
making explicit something one can 
 
do
 
 as something
one can 
 
say
 
. This is a capacity to translate ‘knowing
how’ into a ‘knowing that’ which is expressed in
terms of 
 
commitments
 
 and 
 
entitlements
 
, ‘as putting
it in a form in which it can both serve as and stand
in need of reasons’ (Brandom 2001, 11). The sense
of ‘implicit’ in this holistic-inferential account does
not presume that the reasons that can be made
explicit were present as the maxims behind the
actions to which they are retroactively attributed. It
just means there is no sharp line between unarticulated
know-how and explicit knowledge (Taylor 2000);
and that the latter should be thought of as providing
a step towards acknowledging the responsibilities
entailed in actions.
This interpretation of the order of priority that
holds between different sorts of intentionality
opens up the possibility of reconfiguring the logical
geography of action. It supposes that different
modalities of action enact their own ‘validity
conditions’ that can, in principle, be made explicit
in public practices of giving and asking for reasons
(e.g. Bridge 2007; Flyvbjerg 2001; Lovibond 2002).
This reconsideration of the pragmatics of expressive
rationality reconfigures understandings of delibera-
tion that underlie theories of democracy, justice and
legitimacy (see Habermas 2000; Brandom 2000). This
overlaps with attempts to develop thoroughgoing
accounts of affective deliberation in contemporary
democratic theory (e.g. Krause 2007; Hoggett and
Thompson 2002). This work makes explicit the
relevance of affective aspects of life for deliberative
models of democracy that work up from the principle
of affected interest, according to which those affected
by actions and outcomes should have some say in
defining the parameters of those actions and outcomes.
The upsurge of interest in the theme of affect
speaks in compelling ways to a recurrent problem
in democratic theory: how to respect citizens as
competent moral agents whilst acknowledging the
web of dependent, conditioned relationships into
which they are thrown. There is an extensive litera-
ture in political science on the role that non-rational
sentiments, feelings and emotions play in the political
decisionmaking processes. This is a literature which
is empirically grounded (e.g. Marcus 2002), and
explicitly reconfigures understandings of the
relationships between rationality, reason and action
(e.g. McDermott 2004). The degree to which affective
capabilities can be articulated with public procedures
of democratic legitimacy is a central problem in
post-Habermasian critical theory’s project of describ-
ing the conditions of radical democratic, pluralistic
constitutionalism (e.g. Habermas 2006; Honneth
2007; Markell 2000). Berlant’s (2005a) historiography
of affective publics in American culture establishes
that any and all political public spheres are shaped
by affective energies, while Sedgwick (2003) and
Riley (2005) have explored the affective dynamics
of textual practices. In moral philosophy, affect is
embraced as a means of rethinking the role of
partiality in deliberative practices, for example in
Baier’s (1994) feminist ethics of moral prejudice
which roots reason in affects, or in Blackburn’s
(1998) Humean reconstruction of practical reason.
The key thought guiding these reconfigurations of
affect-with-reason is the idea that rationality emerges
out of situated encounters with others. This same
theme underwrites the work of political theorists
reconfiguring democratic theory around an apprecia-
tion of the affective registers of justice and injustice,
expressed in an emphasis on the arts of receptivity,
of listening and acknowledging and responding
(e.g. Young 1997; Coles 2005).
Thrift’s spatial politics of affect and Connolly’s
neuropolitics of media affects sits, therefore, in a
much broader range of work that is concerned with
affective aspects of political life. But the examples
noted above all focus on the affective aspects of life
 
without
 
 adopting a vocabulary of ontological layers,
levels and priority. This is in contrast to the charac-
teristic ontologisation of affect in human geography.
The ontologisation of affect as a layer of pre-
conscious ‘priming to act’ reduces embodied action
simply to the dimension of being attuned to and
coping with the world. This elides the aspect of
embodied knowing that involves the capacity to
take part in ‘games of giving and asking for reasons’.
While the ontologisation of theory in human
geography has been accompanied by claims to
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transform and reconfigure understandings of
what counts as ‘the political’, this project has been
articulated in a register which eschews the conventions
of justification, that is, the giving and asking for
reasons. This is particularly evident when it comes
to accounting for why the contemporary deployment
of affective energy in the public realm is bad for
democracy. The contemporary deployment of
anxious, obsessive and compulsive affect in the
political realm is presented as having ‘deleterious
consequences’ on the grounds that it works against
democratic expression (Thrift 2007, 253); contributes
to a style of democracy that is consumed but not
practised (2007, 248); promotes forms of sporadic
engagement that can be switched on and off (2007,
240); and generally leads to certain dispositions
being placed beyond question. There is certainly
a vision of democracy as a particular type of
engaged ethical practice at work in these occasional
judgements (2007, 14), but the precise normative
force of this view is not justified in any detail.
The eschewing of justification arises in part because
the 
 
content
 
 of these ontologies, which emphasise
various layers of knowing that kick-in prior to
representation, is projected directly onto the 
 
form
 
of exposition. There is a particular type of authority
put into play in this move. The avowedly anti-
intentionalist materialism associated with contemp-
orary cultural-theoretic ontologies of affect closes
down the conceptual space in which argument and
disagreement can even get off the ground (see
Leys 2007). In contrast, and as outlined above, the
argument pursued here follows an avowedly ‘non-
representationalist’ perspective according to which
assertions of knowledge, including the types of
knowledge asserted by ontologies of affect, always
stand in need of reasons, precisely because they
emerge as reasons for certain sorts of 
 
commitments
 
and 
 
entitlements
 
 (Brandom 1996, 167). On this under-
standing ontological assertions act as justifications,
and are subject to the demand for justification. If
‘placing things in the space of reasons’ (McDowell
1994, 5) in this sense is not acknowledged as one
aspect of practice, then recourse to the ontological
register closes down the inconclusive conversations
upon which democratic cultural politics depends
(Rorty 2006).
This paper therefore addresses two aspects of
the logical geography of political ontologies of
affect. First, attention is paid to the layer-cake
model of the relationship between ‘doing’ and
‘knowing’ which underwrites the claims about the
political salience of ontologies of affect. This is the
focus of the following two sections on ‘Affective
mediations of power’. Second, this is related to the
foreclosure by these ontologies of the space for the
giving of and asking for reasons, understood as
both an ordinary aspect of practical conduct and a
conventional virtue of academic argument. This is
the focus of the section ‘Affecting politics’.
 
Affective mediations of power I: 
manipulating infrastructures of feeling
 
In human geography and urban studies, the clearest
articulation of the political relevance of ontologies
that theorise agency in terms of affect is provided
by Nigel Thrift (see 2004a 2006 2007). This section
identifies a recurrent trope of manipulation which
underwrites claims that ontologies of affect rethink
‘the political’. Thrift’s argument builds on and
contributes to recent work on the phenomenology
of everyday urban life which has drawn attention
to how the design of spaces can effectively
background and habituate a set of preferences and
pathways of action and interaction (e.g. Allen 2006;
Bridge 2005; French and Thrift 2002; Latham and
McCormack 2004; Laurier and Philo 2006). In this
research, urban space emerges as a medium for the
inculcation of various hateful, hopeful, desirous or
respectful dispositions.
For Thrift, the lesson drawn from this sort of
research is a heightened awareness of the extent to
which ‘affective response can be designed into
spaces’ (Thrift 2004b, 68). Knowledge of affect,
marshalled by firms, planners, architects and other
actors, provides ‘a new minute landscape of manipula-
tion (2004b, 66). Thrift argues that knowledge of
the workings of affect has become increasingly
important to the way in which urban capitalism
reproduces and reinvents itself (Thrift 2004e
2005c):
 
whereas affect has always, of course, been a constant of
urban experience, now affect is more and more likely to
be actively engineered with the result that it is
becoming something more akin to the networks of
pipes and cables that are of such importance in
providing the basic mechanics and root textures of
urban life. (Thrift 2004b, 58)
 
These affective infrastructures are enacted through
various ‘lively devices’, such as software, proliferating
performative spaces of the screen, and various
calculative technologies (Thrift 2004a 2004c 2005b).
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Together, these help constitute the ‘technological
unconscious’ of contemporary urban living (Thrift
2004d), or more pertinently to the argument here,
the ‘technological anteconscious’ (Thrift 2007, 10).
Thrift has therefore developed a body of work
which makes a concerted effort to outline what an
affective politics might consist of. It reorders our
sense of just how deeply embedded harm, inequality
and injustice are in fabric of everyday life (Thrift
2005a). And it challenges our understandings of
just what shape effective political agency might
take in the wake of this acknowledgement (see
Graham and Thrift 2007).
When it comes to expounding on why affect
matters politically, Thrift’s argument is that we
should take affect seriously because it amounts to
a whole new surface for the exercise of power,
through the ‘tendency towards the greater and
greater engineering of affect’ (2004b, 64). This
argument starts off with a neutral sounding
observation:
 
systematic knowledges of the creation and mobilisation
of affect have become an integral part of the everyday
urban landscape: affect has become part of a reflexive
loop which allows more and more sophisticated
interventions in various registers of urban life. (2004b, 58)
 
From this, we are quickly moved onto a stronger
sense of the powers of affect:
 
these knowledges are not only being deployed
knowingly, they are being deployed politically (usually
but not only by the rich and powerful) to political ends:
what might have been painted an aesthetic is increasingly
instrumental. (2004b, 58)
 
Affect, it turns out, is now engineered as a whole
infrastructure of feeling that is deployed instrumentally
for the pursuit of expanded commodification. If
this is not worrying enough, then the same
affective technologies that have been developed to
modulate the action of consumers ‘are now being
moved over into the political sphere with mainly
deleterious consequences’ (Thrift 2007, 26). The
political stake in understanding affect therefore lies
in better understanding the dynamics of various
affective technologies ‘through which masses of
people become primed to act’ (2007, 26).
Thrift’s rendition of the spatial politics of affect
adopts a particular rhetorical register through
which a vision of ‘the political’ is deduced from
this account of contemporary urban infrastructures
of feeling. Affect is consistently presented as a
medium of 
 
manipulation
 
:
 
the discovery of new means of practicing affect is also
the discovery of a whole new means of manipulation
by the powerful. (Thrift 2004b, 58)
 
Modern urban capitalism is increasingly driven by
the ‘the manipulation of affect’. In turn, this
management of affect is undertaken instrumentally
and strategically – that is, not communicatively, to
lapse into a Habermasian distinction for a moment.
It is not routed through the representational
circuitry of minded, intentional consciousness.
These days, it turns out, ‘the rich and powerful’
reproduce their privilege by getting at people not at
the level of what they think or what they recognise,
but more directly at the level of what they feel.
Thrift articulates the relevance of an ontology of
affect for political theory by arguing that it draws
into view new forms of what he calls the ‘politics of
credence’ (Thrift 2006). The rhetoric of manipulation
is deployed to assert both the political relevance of
affect, and to assert the heightened importance of
space as a surface for pursuing this type of strategy.
New forms of the politics of credence ‘rely on the
manipulation of the micro-fabric of space and time
in order to maximize an affective bounty’ (Thrift
2006, 548). If affect is ‘intimately connected with
the political and the exercise of politics’, then in
turn, ‘generating affect relies on manipulating
space’ (2006, 557). Space is involved in every point
of the generation of affect. This argument concerning
the affective instrumentalisation of space, under-
stood as a kind of ‘force field of effects’ (Bridge
2007), is bolstered by recourse to an instrumentalist
rhetoric of ‘the flurries of anxiety’ which are ‘let
loose’ by the media and the ‘waves of anger and
rage’ which are ‘marshalled and directed’ by armies.
‘The media’ are the exemplary technologies that
Thrift alights upon in accounting for the affective
reproduction of authoritarian capitalism and sham
democracy (Thrift 2007, 235–54). ‘The media’ are
presented as the model for understanding the process
of ‘affective contagion’, the way in which affects
are spread through the more or less instrumental
modulation of dispositions of imitation and
suggestibility (2007, 235). In Thrift’s account of
contemporary Western democratic cultures, the
selective engineering of anxiety, obsession and
compulsion (2007, 240) for political ends is carried
off through the generalised ‘mediation of society’
(2007, 245). A specific ontological claim is invoked
in this analysis: affect is located in the ‘the half-
second delay between action and cognition’ (2007,
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243). This general condition of proprioception is
given a specifically political inflection in Thrift’s
political diagnosis of the contemporary conjuncture.
This temporal gap is the space in which bare life
itself is susceptible to manipulation by ‘dark forces’
in an increasingly mediated world. It is in this
interval that various feelings can be ‘pre-treated’ so
that what appear to be volitional, wilful actions,
beliefs or thoughts turn out to be already primed
dispositions. Just what it is that make ‘the media’
quite so effective as instruments for the circulation
of affect is never quite specified in Thrift’s account,
beyond the sense that the proliferation of media
multiplies the points for applying affective technol-
ogies to ‘inherently susceptible, receptive, exposed’
bodies (2007, 239). The next section considers how
the sense that ‘the media’ now constitute the
space of politically motivated affective contagion is
inflected in the account of degenerate democracy
developed by the political theorist William
Connolly.
 
Affective mediations of power II: 
the neuropolitics of media affects
 
An important reference point for spatial ontologies
of affect is the recent work of William Connolly
(2002b) on neuropolitics. It serves as an authoritative
reference point in Thrift’s spatial politics of affect,
in Gibson-Graham’s (2006) vision of the counter-
hegemonic politics of affective subjectivity, and in
work on the geopolitics of affect (e.g. Carter and
McCormack 2006; O’Tuathail 2003). Just as Thrift’s
politics of affect constructs urban public space
and ‘the media’ as a privileged scene of affective
manipulation, so Connolly’s account of the neuro-
politics of affect relies on a particular account of the
public circulation of affect. Connolly combines a
strong ontology of affects, a borrowed account of
neurological firing, and Deleuzian film theory to
develop a fully blown political ontology of publicly
circulated media affects. Connolly’s affirmative
account of the politics of affect explicitly addresses
key aspects of normative democratic theory. It
informs an account of democratic pluralism that is
presented as an alternative to theories of democratic
deliberation indebted to political philosophers such
as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.
Connolly’s account of the politics of affect stakes
a great deal on a claim about the priority of ‘know-
how’ over ‘propositional knowledge’ in the ‘layering’
together of mind–body–culture (Connolly 2002b,
92). Connolly (2002b, 83), like Thrift, invests great
weight in neurophysiological research on the ‘half-
second delay’ between the reception of sensory
data and the conscious interpretation of it. The
idea that certain actions precede the feelings that
are retrospectively presented as their causes is
generalised by Connolly to all forms of perception
and judgement. There is a strong affinity here with
Thrift’s precise placement of affect in this temporal
gap. The view that it is ‘in those small spaces of
time between action and cognition’ that affect does
its work underwrites a ‘layer-cake’ model of politics
understood as varied efforts to intervene in the
visceral registers located in this temporal interval
(Thrift 2006, 560–1). It is in ‘the small space of time
between action and cognition’ (Thrift 2007, 24) that
corporations and political actors experiment with
the background conditions of bare life. Connolly’s
work on the politics of affect assumes that this
gap implies an order of conceptual priority. In his
account of the ‘layering of body/brain/culture’,
the visceral register of affect is understood to work
below the level of and prior to deliberative argument.
This claim of layering and priority is significant for
understanding why the challenge Connolly presents
to Rawlsian and Habermasian accounts of democratic
culture takes the form of a picture of democratic
pluralism as an 
 
ethos 
 
rather than a set of rationalis-
ing procedures.
Connolly provides a compelling account of the
political salience of an ontology of affect. This
builds on his conceptualisation of the relationship
between ‘relational techniques of the self’ and
‘micropolitics’ (Connolly 2002b, 20–1). Relational
techniques of the self are those
 
choreographed mixtures of word, gesture, image, sound,
rhythm, smell and touch that help to define the
sensibility in which your perception, thinking, identity,
beliefs, and judgment are set. (Connolly 2002b, 20)
 
Micropolitics refers to
 
such techniques organized and deployed collectively
by professional associations, mass-media talk shows,
TV and film dramas, military training, work processes,
neighborhood gangs, church meetings, school assemblies,
sports events, charitable organizations, commercial
advertising, child rearing, judicial practice, and police
routines. (Connolly 2002b, 20–1)
 
If the relational techniques are the means through
which artful selves tactically work on themselves,
then micropolitical practices regularly impinge
upon these practices of ethical and associational
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becoming: arts of the self and micropolitics are
‘two sides of the same coin’ (Connolly 1999, 149).
They are the stuff out of which selves work on
themselves, more or less attentively.
Connolly constructs a model of micropolitics in
which ‘the political’ remains firmly tethered to
determinant moments of decision, such as winning
elections, handing down court judgements or
passing legislation:
 
Consider some macropolitical proposals: ‘Let’s allow
gays in the military’. ‘Let’s allow individuals the right
to doctor assisted suicide’. ‘Let’s get rid of the property
tax and give everybody an equal education’. ‘Let’s save
the rain forests in North America’. None of these
proposals, enunciated by a court, a parliament, or
executive decree, is either likely to be made or get very
far unless and until micropolitical receptivity to it has
been nurtured across several registers and constituencies.
(Connolly 1999, 149)
 
Connolly’s account of micropolitics presents a
tightly mediated view of the relationship between
formal politics and a diffuse set of cultural practices.
This tendency has been heightened in Connolly’s
most recent work on neuropolitics.
Connolly’s (2002b) neuropolitics of affect relies
on a selective reading of the literature on neuro-
science by writers such as Varela (1999) and Damasio
(2000).
 
1
 
 Connolly derives an ontological principle
from this scientific field, which is understood to
reveal ‘how much of perception and judgment is
prior to consciousness’ (Connolly 2005b, 73). Connolly
interprets this scientific field as providing a causal
model of the emergent relationship between
micropolitical interventions and macropolitical
outcomes. In so doing, he supposes that certain
philosophical problems can be cleared up if and
when ‘science’ develops the proper understanding
of the human brain (cf. Rée 2004; Descombes
2001). One gets little sense from Connolly’s account
that neuroscience is a contested field, nor much
acknowledgement that the implications of this
field for political theory and moral philosophy
are far from cut-and-dried (e.g. Bennett 
 
et al.
 
 2007;
Churchland 2006; Habermas 2007; Rorty 2004;
Searle 2006).
Developing a political diagnosis of the present
conjuncture on the basis of an ontologised interpreta-
tion of neuroscience is associated with the reduction
of ‘the media’ to a mere medium, understood as a
means to an end that can supposedly be grasped
independently of the specificities of the medium
as such. In Connolly’s (2002b) recent account of
neuropolitics, micropolitics is quite literally big-P
Politics writ small. It is the means through which
the agendas of ‘Political politics’ become inscribed
in the recesses of the sub-cortical zones of the
brain:
 
Micropolitics in and around the dinner table, the
church, the movie theater, the union hall, the TV sitcom
and talk show, the film, the classroom, and the local
meeting set the table for macro-policy initiatives in
these domains by rendering large segments of the
public receptive or unreceptive to them. (Connolly
2002a, 3)
 
On Connolly’s account, the paradigmatic mediums
for this micropolitical priming of receptive subjects
are the techniques of cinematic representation and
the dark arts of political campaign advertising on
television. Classical media-effects research is often
criticised for assuming a hypodermic model of
media power, ascribing to ‘the media’ the ability to
inject their preferred messages into the minds of
their audiences. Connolly goes one better than this:
his account of media-
 
affects
 
 is meant almost literally
as a hypodermic model of influence, with media
technologies ascribed remarkable determinative
power in infusing affective dispositions under the
skin of their audiences.
Connolly’s account of the politics of affect relies
on a very specific ontology of Film. Film serves as
his paradigm of cultural practice in general, for
understanding how artistry and technique are con-
figured in a world of omnipotent and ubiquitous
screens to organise perception and consolidate
habits. By translating neuroscience into an ontology
of political affects via a specific style of Film analysis,
Connolly constructs a conceptual-methodological
mechanism of affective interpellation. Echoing
another classical problem of media research, this
allows the critic to substitute their own analysis of
the imputed effects/affects of Film or campaign
advertisements for any substantive analysis of the
practices in which these sound-images are embedded.
Connolly’s reading of Film adopts a Deleuzian
methodology, focusing primarily on ‘technique’
rather than ‘symbolic interpretation’ to explain the
relationship between politics and film (Connolly
2002a). Interpretative approaches to visual media
always generate the conceptual and methodological
problem of how and whether image–sound
assemblages actually affect audiences in the ways
intended. Connolly’s combination of Deleuzian
Film theory and neuroscience generates no such
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problem, precisely because the extra-disciplinary
appeal to science seems to provide a cast-iron
account of how ‘the media’ engineer outcomes by
circumventing interpretative layers of action com-
pletely. The same move is evident in Thrift’s media
ontology, which presents affect as working through
a generalised power of automatism: ‘the body is
the medium for the transmission of force but
without any conscious volition’ (2007, 241). This
understanding of affect working to make various
dispositions automatic allows Thrift to imply that
empirical evidence showing that the subjects of
mediascapes are not completely credulous actually
confirms that, in fact, at a deeper level they are.
After all, the effectiveness of affective technologies
lies in instilling the feeling that subjects are agents
of free will and volition by implanting this feeling
in ‘a substrate of the will which is not conscious’
(2007, 246).
In Connolly’s theory of affective media spaces, a
claim about the ontological 
 
layering
 
 of affect
beneath consciousness is combined with a claim
about 
 
priority
 
 to present media practices as highly
influential mediums for the micropolitical priming
of political agency. Connolly uses the example of
the persistent charge levelled against John Kerry in
the 2004 US Presidential election, that he was prone
to ‘flip-flops’ on key issues, to claim that media
affects are the key technologies mediating between
the micro and macro levels of contemporary politics.
The flip-flop charge was, Connolly suggests, ‘planted’
in the minds of the electorate early on in the 2004
campaign, during the Primary season, before Kerry
was installed as the Democratic candidate and
before people were explicitly ‘tuned in’ to the
Presidential campaign:
 
They were distracted, thus primed to receive subliminal
messages. It was renewed later, after being installed in
the lower psyches of many voters as a fact as if they
had discerned it themselves. (Connolly 2005b, 9)
 
Connolly initially invokes a straightforwardly chrono-
logical sense of temporal order: a theme ‘planted’
at some earlier date is ‘renewed’ at a subsequent
one. This chronological ordering is then collapsed
into a stronger claim about the priority of layered
embodied-affective dispositions over explicit representa-
tional reasoning in generating calculable electoral
outcomes. His claim is that the pinning of the
‘flip-flop’ charge to Kerry helps us ‘to discern how
media presentations do much of their work below
the level of explicit attention’ (Connolly 2005c,
880). Here, in contrast to the chronological ordering
identified above, the order of priority being
claimed refers to a distinction between explicit and
implicit attention. Connolly is careful to say that
media do not simply manipulate people’s feelings.
But the force of this disavowal is somewhat
undermined by his clarification that the media do
predispose people to accept certain messages (2005c,
880). It remains unclear whether the point of the
analysis of neurologically mediated micropolitics is
to claim that affective technologies are good at
mobilising people to act in ways they are already
predisposed toward, or at actually shaping those
predispositions in the first place and then mobilising
them at election time. Connolly’s discussion of the
low-down-and-dirty campaigning against Kerry is
meant to illustrate the affective effectiveness of
election campaign advertising. The implication is
that the flip-flop charge put people off voting for
Kerry, but this claim is not empirically substantiated
in his analysis.
There are good reasons to doubt whether the
analysis of Film can bear the diagnostic weight
ascribed to it in Connolly’s political ontology of
media affects. The idea that the analysis of Film
discloses invariant features of technique shared by
other visual media overlooks the quite distinctive
ontological features that differentiate film from, for
example, television (see Cavell 1982). Connolly
shows little concern for the practices in which the
image–sound assemblages of film or television
spots are enacted. The determinative power ascribed
to Film technique in shaping visceral dispositions
depends on making a great deal out of the observation
that Film plays to ‘captive audiences in darkened
rooms’ (Connolly 2002a, 25). Connolly’s account of
affected individuals being predisposed to favour
particular political slates over others presents these
individuals as essentially isolated monads, watching
TV or films in silence, glued to the screen. Conflating
different mediums, Connolly claims that
 
the TV and film viewer is immobilized before a moving
image and sound track, while the everyday perceiver is
either mobile or one step removed from mobility. The
position of immobility amplifies the affective intensities
received. (2005c, 880)
 
This emphasis on the immobility of the viewer
underplays the degree to which, in contrast to
the clear emplacement of film viewers in front of
projected film images, the phenomenology of
electronic media like television redistributes the
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subject of television into the distanciated spaces of
mediation itself (Weber 1996). The distinctive
ontology of television means that, in this medium,
it is ‘the powerful’ who are obliged to attune
themselves to the affective modalities of presentation
inherent in the phenomenology of these spaces, or
risk suffering the consequences (Berlant 2005b;
Scannell 1995).
Like Thrift’s spatial politics of affect, Connolly’s
critical account of the neuropolitics of affect presents
‘the media’ as an instrumental medium for doing
groundwork on the political dispositions of massified
subjects. These dispositions are subsequently re-
energised for macropolitical mobilisation. This
argument is attached to a neuro-ontology centred
on a rhetorical construction of the pre-cognitive
visceral priming of subjects’ feelings and emotions.
The combination of appeals to scientific authority
and ontological claims of 
 
layering
 
 and 
 
priority
 
 reduces
the question of ‘the political’ to a consideration of
the ways in which various technologies enable
monadic preceptors to be assembled into blocks of
more or less willing, more or less recalcitrant
voters or consumers.
The last two sections have identified how a rhetoric
of manipulation insinuates itself into the critical
account of the politics of affect. This is in part an
effect of the adoption of a layer-cake model of the
relationship between affect and rationality. The
next section explores how this presentation of
affect as a medium of manipulation rebounds on
the attempt to present an affirmative account of the
politics of affect.
 
Affecting politics
 
Connolly’s account of the politics of affect is
unashamedly partisan, concerned with how the
progressive Left can learn to be as good at the arts
of collectively mobilising affect as the Right has
been (Connolly 2005b). But the critical account of
affect makes it difficult to avoid a sense that
politics is all about interventions that go on below
the threshold of explicit articulation, and this
clearly presents a problem for any critically inclined
left-liberal academic. Affect is ascribed political
significance because it is the medium for efforts at
priming subjects to act in more or less malign, hateful,
hopeful, generous or benign ways. Progressive
politics is now understood as a form of experiment
(Connolly 2006), which has a nice open-ended ring
to it. But such experimenting actually involves the
‘application of techniques’ to populations with the
aim of prompting new modes of responsiveness.
Connolly himself recognises that seen like this, as
what he calls ‘tactical work on dispositions installed
below consciousness’ (2002b, 82), the affective-
experimental view of politics might have a somewhat
less nice ring to it. Viewing politics as a sub-cortical
machine carries with it, he acknowledges, the danger
of ‘becoming an envoy of cultural manipulation’
(2006, 74). To ward off this danger, he recommends
that the Left adopt a ‘three-tiered strategy’:
 
you expose the tactics of those who do not themselves
call attention to them; you introduce counterstrategies
of cultural-corporeal infusion attached to a more
generous vision of public life; and you publicize, as
you proceed, how these counterstrategies themselves
impinge upon the affectively rich, nonconscious layers
of life. (2006, 74)
 
There are two points worth making about this
proposal. First, it seems to carry the very high
probability of being self-defeating as a strategy for
mobilising affective registers that are supposed to
work without making themselves knowable.
Second, this ethic of publicly reflexive disclosure
invokes a norm of rationalising legitimacy that
seems to run counter to the tenor of the ontological
argument by which we arrived at this dilemma in
the first place. This is a recurrent feature of
political ontologies of affect. It is here that political
ontologies of affect lay themselves open to the
charge of 
 
cryptonormativism
 
: in order to elaborate
on the political relevance of their claims, they
implicitly invoke the persuasive force of norms
that theorists of affect are unwilling to openly avow,
and which their own theories seem to undermine
(Anderson A 2006).
Like Connolly, Thrift also presents an affirmative
account of the progressive political experiments on
affect which ‘might legitimately be made’ (2004a,
58). The positive politics of credence is presented as
a form of cultural work on dispositions and habits.
This is couched in the same instrumentalist rhetoric
as the critical account. Progressive politics is now
understood as a means of experimenting on affective
dispositions embedded in everyday spaces, under-
taken with the aim of ‘maneuvering minoritarian
formations in from the margins of the concerns of
conventional political bodies’ (Thrift 2006, 561).
Connolly’s concern about being seen as an envoy
of manipulation and Thrift’s passing reference to
legitimacy are traces of a road not taken in this
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style of ontologised theory. The theoretical resources
drawn on by political ontologies of affect affirm
finitude as the very condition of voluntary action.
One might therefore expect the affect onto-story –
a story derived from various phenomenological
accounts of ready-at-handedness, background,
throwness and bolstered by the somewhat selective
invocation of the authority of the life sciences – to
fundamentally shift the terms in which democratic
legitimacy can be thought. The second section of
this paper has already indicated some of the
diverse literature that undertakes to start this task.
However, the political ontologies of affect considered
here tend to fall back on some quite conventional
images of legitimacy to articulate their critical
perspective on contemporary politics, without ever
avowing the values that this appeal entrains.
The political frisson of the ontologisation of affect
is made to depend on a conflation of a universal
hypothesis about the necessary backgrounding of
conditions of intentional action with a specific
claim that ‘power’ is naturalised directly into bodily
comportments and habits of feeling that elude the
workings of consciousness. For example, there is a
slippage between the claim that affect as a general
feature of life ‘is a semiconscious phenomenon,
consisting of a series of automatisms’ (Thrift 2007,
239), and the rhetorical account of how political
feeling is increasingly engineered by embedding
various automatisms into everyday life. If the
former claim holds, then it is not clear why finding
examples of such automatism in everyday life is,
on its own, cause for any concern at all. However,
programmatic statements about the politics of
affect tend to fall back on an implicit claim that any
external determination of action is 
 
a priori
 
 suspect.
The implicit norm invoked in accounts of the
micropolitical, mass-mediated manipulation of
predispositions is certainly a noble one: people are
unfree as far as their actions are directed by some-
one else’s intentions to do things they might not
have voluntarily chosen to do, thus hindering their
own potential for flourishing. If the engineering of
affect is ‘producing new forms of power’ (Thrift
2004b, 68), then these are meant to worry us because
they work behind our backs, without us knowing
it. In short, they should worry us because they are
leading to the danger ‘that very large amounts of
political thinking will be automated’ (Amin and
Thrift 2005, 229).
The imperative behind Thrift’s account of the
spatial politics of affect
 
is the growing realization that there are landscapes of
space, time and experience that have been ceded too
readily to powerful naturalizing forces which erase the
prospect of political action even before it starts by
producing 
 
backgrounds
 
. (2007, 19)
 
These backgrounds ‘make certain aspects of the
events we constantly come across not so much
hard to question as hard to even think of as
containing questions at all’ (2007, 19). Backgrounding
here takes on the character of a political strategy in
its own right, rather than a general condition of
intentional action, and is made to seem suspect on
the grounds that it depoliticises certain aspects of
action by making sure they are not even noticed.
What raises one’s doubts about this account of ‘the
political’ is not just that the grounds for this
evaluation are not spelt out. It is the feeling that
the implicit norm appealed to might actually be
undermined by the tradition of thought which
serves as the ontological foundation for the critical
account.
The persuasive force of both the critical and
affirmative accounts of the politics of affect seems
to turn on the sense that something important is
at stake in submitting to and embracing specific
affective regimes:
 
For it is quite clear that there are enormous emotional
costs and benefits for individuals and groups in being
shaped by particular institutions in particular ways.
However, it is often quite difficult to show what is at
stake for the individuals or groups in submitting to
such institutions and embracing certain affective styles
that render them deferential, obedient or humble – or
independent, aggressive and arrogant. (Thrift 2004b, 69)
 
This acknowledgement seems to present an occasion
to enter into an argument about how and why
certain sorts of submission, to certain sorts of
affective regimes, may or may not be justifiable,
legitimate, or malign and unjust. It is here, in other
words, that one might expect the intuition behind
the ‘quite clear’ to be worked up into an effort to
‘show’ what is at stake. But no such argument or
demonstration is forthcoming. Perhaps this is due
to a residual sense that to articulate a justificatory
argument would somehow do an injustice to the
integrity of visceral feeling out of which ‘proto-
political longings for change’ (Thrift 2004b, 69)
initially emerge. The notion that rationality – asking
for and giving reasons – might be put to good
effect in the service of such intuitions does not
seem to be countenanced. Instead, we are offered a
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list of preferred ethical stances which, in the absence
of any argument as to why these are to be the pre-
ferred virtues of personal conduct, are recommended
to us primarily on the grounds that they are the best
way of cultivating a certain sort of open, creative,
experimental, hopeful character (2004b, 68).
Connolly’s intellectual project for a decade or
more has explicitly concerned itself with the
elaboration of a fully-fledged ethos of democratic
pluralisation (Connolly 1995 1999 2005a). This ethos
is elaborated as a process of self-expressive agonistic
confrontation and enlarged generosity. This is an
ethos of flourishing critical responsiveness (1995,
xv–xix), one that aims to proliferate the forms in
which pluralism is democratically negotiated, and
to multiply the sources of incorrigible values that
generate pluralistic contestation. The elaboration of
an ethos of engagement (1999, 137–61) indicates
that the layered understanding of mind and body,
habit and reflection in the affect onto-story is not
wholly at odds with approaches that focus on
deliberative reason. The development of accounts
of the ethos of democracy follows from the
acknowledgement that citizen’s affective attachments
to diverse conceptions of the good is an irreducible
feature of public life that cannot be contained by
neutral procedures (Krause 2004). Accounts of
democratic ethos are presented as figures for
alternative regulative practices that might help
reproduce fidelity to democratic principles.
The ethos of engagement, like other accounts of
democratic ethos, therefore fills a procedural-
shaped hole in normative democratic theory. It
augments and displaces Habermasian consensualism
and Rawlsian overlapping consensus with a more
fecund image of democratic culture (Connolly
1999, 35–6, 70). And yet, while there is a promise
that the political ontology of affective neuropolitics
can provide a ‘modification’ to those sorts of
democratic theories (Connolly 2002b, 36), Connolly
has had nothing to say ‘about affect within specific
processes of evaluative judgement’, and even less
to say about ‘what normative models of political
judgment and democratic deliberation would
look like after an appropriate affective inflection’
(Krause 2007, 2; see also Krause 2006).
The ontologising of affect, and the recourse to
the rhetoric of ethos, might in fact militate against
any such modification. The ontologisation of affect
expels affect from the space of reasons by drawing
too sharp a distinction between different layers
of perception and action that are assumed to be
related in an order of conceptual priority. The
recourse to ethos-talk marks a choice to deploy a
genre that allows one to register a commitment to
certain values without having to directly avow
norms and principles or present arguments in
favour of them (Anderson A 2006, 137). The question
that remains, however, is whether the content of
ontologies that disclose the aspects of action that
are pre-conscious and dispositional rather than
highly reflective justifies the eschewing of reasons
at the level of theoretical exposition.
The eschewing of reasons might also betray an
unacknowledged parochialism in these ontologies
of affect. Affectively enhanced onto-stories actively
embrace as a virtue rather than a vice the recurring
difficulty that characterises deliberative accounts
of democratic pluralism: have in not being able to
outline neutral procedures for negotiating across
difference without positing a particular substantive
conception of the good life. Eschewing reason-giving
in favour of the enactment of affectively infused
figures of democratic ethos therefore openly courts
the possibility of universalising culturally specific
norms. Only now, the universalisation is not of
rationalist norms of deliberative argumentation,
but of affectively sedimented models of good character
and public virtue, such as generosity and respon-
sibility. And this runs the risk of prejudging the sorts
of harm and injustice to which the emergence of
democratic politics is a situational response (see
Dryzek 2005).
In short, we can see that the ontology of affect
stands as a 
 
reason
 
 to favour an affective ethos of
democratic pluralisation that promises a less
strenuous and more open account of the cultural
conditions of democratic politics. But in enacting
this commitment, it opens the space for a demand
that some justification at least be offered for the
preference accorded to the particular virtues espoused
by this ethos.
 
Placing affect in the space of reasons
 
Both Thrift’s ontology of spatial affects and Connolly’s
ontology of media affects ask us to worry about the
political implications of the designed, engineered,
automated qualities of contemporary spaces of public
interaction. But they do so without specifying any
reasons why, or when, we should worry. This work
challenges the rationalist pieties of democratic
theory, and even points out the inadvertent sources
of harm and injustice that might inhabit these
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theories. However, these ontologised accounts of
affective politics are characterised by an ambivalence
that also gives us pause for thought and reflection.
This is ambivalence between claiming that any
and all subjective apprehension of the self relies
on a background of affective dispositions, and a
politically inflected claim that the manipulation of
these background conditions in particular situations
carries with it a normatively charged threat of
harm or injustice, in the form of involuntary
submission to the will of others. What remains
unexplored is how and when one might tell the
difference between these two aspects of life, or
even what reconfigured understanding of criteria
might help in this task.
Two related questions are provoked by the ontol-
ogised, instrumental interpretation of the political work
that ‘affect’ does, not so much behind people’s
backs as under their skins.
First, in the 
 
critical vision of the politics of affect
 
,
affect matters politically because it opens up new
surfaces for the exercise of manipulation. This
leaves aside the question of the circumstances in
which being ‘manipulated’ is a bad thing, politically
or ethically. Excitement, joy, hope, love, surprise,
distress, anguish, fear, terror, anxiety, obsession,
compulsion, shame, hatred, humiliation, contempt,
disgust, anger and rage have no 
 
a priori
 
 political
valence at all. This depends on what it is they are
mobilised around or attached to. Manipulating
affective dispositions around some topics or objects
might not always be meaningfully described as
political. Knowing whether it should be depends
on a willingness to take seriously how those
affected interpret the issue at hand.
Second, in the 
 
affirmative vision of the politics of
affect
 
, ontologies of affect are presented as the basis
of new models of progressive politics, in which
politics is understood as a means of intervening in
affective regimes to bring about new configurations
of feeling. This leaves aside the question of why the
type of academic-artistic experiments that writers
such as Thrift and Connolly recommend count as
‘progressive’, or even minimally ‘legitimate’. Their
value as progressive seems to follow solely from
the ends to which these interventions are oriented
– furthering emotional liberty, or cultivating a
generous ethos of engagement. Their value as
legitimate remains unclear, not least because no
effort is made to clarify what practical implications
the ontology of affect has for the simple democratic
principle according to which those affected by actions
should have some role in defining the parameters
of those actions.
There are a range of registers available for
acknowledging the affective aspects of political
life. Acknowledgement of the affective aspects of
life can serve as an important warning against an
excessively rationalist faith in the power of argument
to resolve disputes. And it should lead us to
embrace with a passion the faith that what we have
left after rationalistic rationality is more argument,
the game of giving of and asking for reasons
without end.
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Note
 
1 See Papoulias and Callard (2007) for a detailed critical
consideration of the politics at work in the inter-
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cultural theory’s turn to affect.
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